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‘Legal at the time’? The case of Mauritian slavery 
 




This paper critiques the ‘legal at the time’ argument used by states and companies which 
practised slavery, examining the Mauritian case. Although slavery was largely legal prior to its 
abolition by the British, torts were common under slavery and in one sliver of history, the years of 
historic rupture, 1794-1839, when the local élite defied first French and then English law, 
generated systemic unlawful activity.  Most types of legal actions for restitution for slavery face 
formidable difficulties and pursuing reparations supported by broad legal arguments may be a 
more viable route. Slavery may be argued to have been an illegitimate endeavour per se.  Whilst 
sympathetic to that argument, we do not pursue it but rather seek to demonstrate that the ‘legal at 
the time’ argument against reparations contains significant lacunae even within its restricted 
terms. We also show that French constitutional law offers possibilities in the form of rights that are 
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We critique the ‘legal at the time’ argument used by states and companies involved in slavery and the slave 
trade, examining the case of Mauritius. Despite the legitimacy of arguments based on the inherent obscenity of 
slavery we seek not to expand these, but rather focus on a narrower critique focusing both on torts committed when 
slavery was formally legal and, more importantly, on a brief period when it appears to have lacked any legal 
foundation at all. While we recognise that some legal cases may be viable, we are more concerned to establish legal 
arguments within the broader reparations movement.  Following Ariela Gross, we seek to ‘expose historical 
assumptions and narratives that oppose redress’1. As Gross herself demonstrates, legal judgements on slavery have 
frequently been informed by incorrect historical assumptions. This work therefore lies at the intersection of law and 
history.   
We consider possible legal arguments available in French and English law, which if they concern those 
foreign states must be raised in France and Britain as Mauritian law requires
2
 . Claims against companies may also 
be viable in Mauritius under these legal systems because of the continued application of both on the island. We 
envisage demands for reparation and specific legal actions without entering into much-debated definitional issues on 
reparations
3
.  We simply conceptualise them as any form of material compensation from the descendants of those 
who benefitted from slavery to the descendants of those who suffered from it. 
Demands for reparations and actions--for example for unlawful enrichment—cannot be clearly separated in 
terms of their legal foundations. We suggest that the broad political case for reparations may be supported by some 
of the legal bases referred to below. In other words our argument is primarily based on the spirit of laws rather than 
on the possibility of bringing specific cases although the latter may occasionally be possible.  We conclude that 
since specific legal actions have very limited possibilities of success, reparations claims based on broad political 
argument with legal underpinnings may represent a more viable option.  
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. First, we provide context on both the international and 
national debates before sketching essential detail on the history of slavery in Mauritius. Next, in the article’s main 
body, we examine in turn possible legal bases for reparations claims against companies and ex-imperial states. 
Finally, we attempt to identify those grounds which appear most likely to succeed.   
 
CONTEXT: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DEBATES AND MAURITIAN SLAVERY  
 
                                                          
1 A Gross “When is the time of slavery? The history of slavery in contemporary legal and political argument” (2008) 96 California Law Review at 
283-321. 
2 R Domingue “Legal method and the Mauritian Legal System” Réduit, University of Mauritius, 2003(25). 
3 For discussion of these complex issues, see T Craemer 2009; “Framing Reparations” (2009)37/2 The Policy Studies Journal at 275-298; S 
Kershnaer “The inheritance-based claim to reparations” (2002)8 Legal Theory at 243-267.  
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Public discussion of slavery has recently intensified globally, and especially in the USA, Africa and Europe, 
the poles of the ‘circular trade’. Indeed, there has been a remarkable upsurge of both scholarly and popular interest 
in slavery’s history and consequences4. In the USA, it has moved from being a long-term fringe discussion among 
intellectuals to becoming a current, mainstream debate
5
.  Museums have been created, public holidays instituted, 
statues erected and demolished, research has intensified and reparations mooted. Entire professions such as 
accountants have had their role in slavery and the slave trade dissected
6
.  The debate has acquired an increasingly 
international dimension, with a large number of apologies being issued from certain nations to others. 
In the USA, the reparations demand has brought some positive if restricted benefits.  In some states, 
companies are required to investigate and disclose their role in slavery
7
. Several major American banks have 
apologized for the profits their ancestor companies made from slavery and in some cases they have set up funds for 
the education of slaves’ descendants. In the USA, the issue is clearly linked to other major matters, not least those of 
Corporate Social Responsibility and national cohesion. Thus, considerable momentum has been generated behind 
the demand over the last two decades, bringing some minor material results.   
In the same period, the demand has brought fewer results in the international context. The first (and, it 
appears, last) Pan-African conference on reparations occurred in Abuja Nigeria in 1993
8
. International conferences 
held in Durban in 2001 and 2009 raised the issue’s international profile, but took no very concrete decisions. 
‘Durban 1’ involved 170 countries and focused on the reparations issue principally in relation to ex-imperial states, 
ending with a declaration that slavery and the slave trade constituted crimes against humanity. Reparations were 
strongly resisted by the ex-imperial states concerned, with the support of some African countries
9. ‘Durban 2’ 
generated no material progress.     
Powerful general legal arguments have already been eloquently made in support of international reparations 
but there is now a need to supplement and elaborate these at the level of individual ex-colonies in order to bring 
more focus and depth to the discussion. Lord Gifford made a major initial contribution to the general arguments at 
the 1993 Abuja Conference
10
.In his influential and compelling paper, he argued that where crimes against humanity 
were concerned, appropriate forms of legal redress already existed in international law. Where inadequate 
mechanisms or remedies existed, these could be devised on the ubi jus, ibi remedium principle. The principle of 
reparations paid by states to other states and to victims was established by Germany and Austria’s payments for 
wartime crimes in 1952 (to Israel) and 1990 (to survivors) respectively. International law also allows for claims by 
                                                          
4 The extensive dimensions of this interest in the USA and internationally are discussed in I Berlin “American slavery in history and memory and 
the search for social justice” March (2004) Journal of American History at 1251-1268. 
5 M A Michelson “The black reparations movement: public opinion and congressional policy making” (2002) 32 Journal of Black Studies at 574-
587. 
6 R D Anes “Accounting and slavery: the accounts of the English South Sea Company1713-22” (2002)11/2 European Accounting Review at 441-
452; D Oldroyd, R K Fleischman & T N Tyson “The culpability of accounting practice in promoting slavery in the British Empire and antebellum 
United States”  (2008) 19/5 Critical Perspectives on Accounting at 764-784; J R Heier “Accounting for the Business of Suffering: A Study of the 
Antebellum Richmond, Virginia, Slave Trade” (2010)46/1  Abacus at 60-83. 
7 P Flaherty and J Carlisle “The case against slave reparations” (National Legal and Policy Center, USA 2004) at 5. 
8 R F Howard-Hassmann “Reparations to Africa and the Group of Eminent Persons” (2004)173-174 Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines at 81-97. 
9 Human Rights in Development Year Book 2001: Reparations: Redressing past wrongs. The Hague: Kluwer Law International and Oslo: Nordic 
Human Rights Publications. Presidents Mbeki of South Africa, Obassanjo of Nigeria and Wade of Senegal all spoke against reparations (3 
September 2001) The Time.s 
10 A Gifford “Legal arguments in support of reparations”  (Paper presented to the first Pan-African Congress on Reparations, Abuja, Federal 
Republic of Nigeria on  27-29 April 1993).  
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descendants, as exemplified by the British Foreign Compensation Act of 1950. Gifford advocated claims on behalf 
of all Africans whether living in Africa or abroad. They would be made against the ex-imperial countries for 
economic, social, cultural and psychological damage caused by slavery, to be settled by an independent international 
tribunal where agreement could not be reached.   
These arguments help establish a baseline for our rather different discussion, which is concerned with a 
specific country. We focus on the ‘legal at the time’ argument which Clifford simply sets aside on the grounds that 
the crime’s sheer dimensions render it invalid. While Clifford’s treatment of the argument has force, there is scope 
for alternative argumentation. We seek to show that there are strong prima facie grounds for rejecting the ‘legal at 
the time’ contention on the basis that events as documented by historians show that it is at least in part an incorrect 
and not simply an inappropriate argument. Moreover, as we show, in French law certain rights have been defined as 
fundamental and, post-French Revolution, cannot be denied in this way.      
The ‘legal at the time’ argument is a cornerstone of the case for refusing reparations.  Until the League Of 
Nations’ Slavery Convention of September 1926 (which came into force 9 March, 1927), no instrument existed at 
international law outlawing slavery.  The initial ‘permissions’ for Catholic countries to practice slavery were 
religious since they were accorded by successive Popes. The argument is linked to the reality that most jurisdictions 
forbid retrospective legislation in their constitutions
11
. Max Du Plessis suggests that it is very difficult to argue that 
acts of slavery committed ‘then amount to a violation of fundamental norms of international law now’ 12. The 
argument is also central to the defences put forward by British banks and insurance companies such as Barclays 
Bank and Lloyds of London
13
.   
However, as we show for the Mauritian case, there is evidence that at least some of the practice of slavery 
involved prima facie breach of laws then current.  Colonialism was and is of course legal; slavery was inextricably 
linked to political power in colonial societies. The power relationships both between slaves and slave owners on the 
one hand and between the slave owners and the French metropolitan revolutionary and British ‘ameliorationist’ 
authorities on the other were such that slave owners acted from a position of strength which meant that they could 
often afford to breach the law with impunity. 
Slavery and the slave trade were global phenomena but the Mauritian case is a suitable and in some senses 
favourable setting for developing our arguments.  First, Mauritius experienced de facto rule by the Netherlands’ East 
India Company in the 17
th
 century and then formal Empire by France (1690-1810) and Great Britain (1810-1968). 
French and English law obtained simultaneously for a long period on the island and continue to do so.  Therefore 
both of these important ex-imperial countries and their very different legal systems are involved. Second, the 
descendants of Mauritian slaves constitute about 25% of a population of some 1, 275,000
14
. Thus, claims affect a 
relatively compact group and the small order of numbers facilitates plotting human interconnections, important in 
building evidence of effects on descendants. Third, partly because it links to the ever-present question of race in this 
                                                          
11 P Flaherty and J Carlisle “The case against slave reparations” (National Legal and Policy Center, USA 2004). 
12 M Du Plessis “Historical injustice and international law: an exploratory discussion of reparation for slavery” (2003)25/3 Human Rights 
Quarterly  at 624-659.  
13 The Times, 16 August 2005 
14 D Michel “Do the descendants of slaves of Mauritius have a claim for reparations?” ( LLM dissertation, Liverpool John Moores University 
2009) at 76.  
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multi-racial society, the issue remains a live one in society at large
15
. Collective memories of slavery and bonded 
labour have long been current reference points; the major Mauritian labour revolts of the late 1930s were presaged 
by meetings in 1935 commemorating the abolition of slavery a century earlier
16
. Awareness of the history of slavery 
and bonded labour is wide among Mauritians. Indeed, it has been suggested that slavery continues to exert a cultural 
influence on relations between managers and employees on the island
17
. As we demonstrate below, Mauritian 
historians have been exceptionally active in documenting slavery’s past. Finally, at least one organisation, the long-
standing non-party political Organisation Fraternelle, is devoted to furthering the reparations cause
18
. It demands 
that the slave owners’ descendants contribute to a fund instituted by the state to ameliorate the position of slaves’ 
descendants, to be administered by the descendants themselves under the control of the Mauritius National 
Assembly
19
. Other parties such as companies and ex-imperial states, would also be asked to contribute. Elsewhere, 
Mauritania has established a fund to reduce poverty among former slaves.  Although this is a different type of fund 
from that proposed by the Organisation Fraternelle, it does demonstrate that some progress has been made in this 
direction in Africa
20
.         
Mauritius has taken significant steps to recognize and commemorate slavery and its aftermath. The 
abolition of slavery has been celebrated since 2011 through a public holiday on 1 February. In 2008, Le Morne 
Brabant, a mountain used as a hiding place by slave maroons became a UNESCO world heritage site. To the best of 
our knowledge, Mauritius is the first country in the world to set up a commission with the objective of assessing the 
effects of slavery and its aftermath.  The Truth and Justice Commission (TJC) was established in February 2009 “to 
make an assessment of the consequences of slave and indentured labour during the colonial period and up to the 
present, and for that purpose, conduct as complete as possible an analysis….’ 21. The body’s work appears likely 
further to raise public awareness and to stimulate detailed scholarly understanding both of the possibility of 
reparations and of the importance of documenting claims adequately. Both are important issues. Reparations and 
collective claims involve inherent difficulties in identifying possible victims and offenders but these are reduced in 
the Mauritian case. Many descendants of slaves may trace their ancestors through their genealogy, a possibility 
made available to citizens by the Mauritian Government
22.  However the TJC’s terms of reference make no mention 
of reparations and it operates, perhaps necessarily, at a slow pace. Archival resources are crucial to reparations and 
legal cases alike. The National Archive of Mauritius, a major potential source for the history of slavery was founded 
at the beginning of the 19
th
 century and therefore may provide documentary evidence to support the case for 
reparations. But it is poorly resourced and has no publicly-available catalogue.   
                                                          
15 S Michel “L’Organisation Fraternelle”  Noir sur Blanc Port Louis: the author, n.d. 
16 S Narain “The Mauritius Labour Party: historical perspective” (Unpublished MA dissertation, University of Mauritius :MAU/D JQ3178. N3 
1999) at 8-10. 
17 A Ramgutty-Wong “HRM in Mauritius” in K Kamoche, Y Debrah, F Horwitz & G N  Muuka (eds.) Managing Human Resources in Africa (2004, 
London: Routledge) at 53-68. 
18 See S Michel “L’Organisation Fraternelle” at 41-42. 
19 Michel, Ibid. 
20 S L Engerman “Apologies, regrets and reparations” (2009)17/3/4 European Review at 599. 
21 Mauritius National Assembly Report (Debate no. 27, 5 August 2008) 
22 Descendants of African slaves may take their birth certificate and identity card to the Nelson Mandela Centre in Port Louis; Descendants of 
Indians may take these documents to the Mahatma Ghandi Institute.  In both cases, their family trees will be documented.  These two 
organisations are funded by the government. 
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The national context may therefore be summarized as follows. First, slavery involved several ex-imperial 
powers. Second, there is a high level of public awareness. Third, an ongoing if slow investigation of slavery may, 
together with long-standing archival resources, assist in building the case. 
One possible ground for actual legal claims seems likely to be one of the versions of ‘unlawful enrichment’ 
available in French, English and Mauritian law. We deal with this further below. The consequence of such 
enrichment seems likely to have been pain and suffering caused by awareness of the brutal treatment of ancestors, 
potentially giving rise to concrete mental and physical health issues. Although it may be that (as has been argued on 
the basis of demographic analysis to be the case in the USA), subsequent generations suffered actual material 
consequences from the treatment of their ancestors, identifiable consequences tended to dissipate with time
23
. On the 
other hand, Zajonc (2003)
24
 suggests, on the basis of detailed econometric analysis, more persistent ‘legacy of 
slavery’ effects on Black enterprise. The relatively disadvantaged position of Mauritian Afro-Creoles may therefore 
be connected with these diffuse effects from slavery
25
.  
There are numerous and acute possible issues with actual legal claims. The first is that they must be ratione 
temporis: their temporal limits must be defined.  Second, they are difficult to document because they must rely on 
archival sources which may not exist or which may contain lacunae. Third, they would have to be conducted at 
extreme historical distance. Even if these demanding conditions proved possible to satisfy, certain types of claim in 
English law such as those for personal injury may be ruled ‘out of time’ in legal terms, i.e. have gone beyond the 
point where the law may be invoked.  We note here however that cases exist in English law where courts have 
refused to reject personal injury claims on the basis that they were ‘out of time’26. Yet the personal injury has to be 
established as occurring to the plaintiff as a direct result of slavery however; simply establishing a wrong done to an 
ancestor and a relationship to that ancestor would be insufficient. Cases have failed on this ground in the USA
27
. We 
therefore suggest that reparations represent a more realistic route. The political case may be buttressed by legal 
arguments. 
  
PRIMA FACIE LEGAL INFRINGEMENTS UNDER DUTCH AND FRENCH RULE  
 
Slavery and the slave trade began in Africa in the 15
th
 century and by the early 16
th
 century both were 
established practices
28
. Mauritian slavery and slave trading started at a later stage and lasted, in historical terms, for 
a relatively short period
29
.  
In 1598, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) first arrived in Mauritius; in two periods of occupation 
between 1641 and 1710, it practised slavery on the island with a Governor in control of junior officers
30
.  Indeed, 
                                                          
23 M Ruef and B Fletcher “Legacies of American Slavery: Status Attainment among Southern Blacks Following Emancipation” (2003)82 Social 
Forces at 445–80. 
24 T Zajonc “Black enterprise and the legacy of slavery” Winter 2003 Review of Black Political Economy at 23-37. 
25 R Laville “In the politics of the rainbow: Creoles and civil society in Mauritius” (2000)18/2 Journal of Contemporary African Studies at 277-294. 
26 See Connelly v RTZ [1998]170, 171 
27 Flaherty and Carlisle, 2004: 6 
28 E Williams Capitalism & Slavery (1994, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press) at 9. 
29 J Black The Slave Trade (2006, London: The Social Affairs Unit) at 63. 
30 J C Low “L’importance de l’occupation néerlandaise dans l’histoire de l’Ile Maurice” in S J T Evers & V Y Hookoomsing (eds) Globalization and 
the South-West Indian Ocean (2000, Leiden/Réduit, International Institute for Asian Studies/University of Mauritius) at 63. 
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being in the words of one historian ‘a thoroughly disreputable crew’,31 they pushed a high number of slaves to 
escape and may even have been forced out of occupation by the large number of slave maroons
32
. If so, this was the 
only such case of ex-slave success in expelling Europeans at least prior to the Saint Domingue revolt at the end of 
the 18
th
 century. In the process, serious physical punishments were meted out to slaves and maroons
33
. The VOC 
first left the island between 1658 and 1672. Slave maroons, because of their dependence on settlers, probably did not 
survive. In a second period of occupation,  Mauritius became ‘one of the most unregulated and anarchic of such 
settlements’34, and another sizeable maroon community was created. A state of constant friction between maroons 
and settlers obtained. In the second period of occupation, three named slaves were brutally executed without trial by 
the VOC for allegedly burning down the company’s stores and headquarters in July 1695. This was clearly unlawful 
at the time. Our argument at this point is not (as it is later in the case of the period 1794-1803) that slavery was 
structurally unlawful, but rather that the actions of the slave owners appear to have been so. The VOC was 
unquestionably responsible and many VOC descendant companies exist. One of the victims was Ana de Bengal, 
whose descendants came down from the hills after the abolition of slavery looking for contract work and whose 




. The Dutch left the island in 1710
36
. Given the existence of 
several archives containing VOC records and the company’s clear responsibility, a claim for reparations from 
successor companies or the Dutch state which oversaw and benefitted from the process may be viable.   
In 1715 Mauritius came under French occupation.  Again, exploitation was organized initially by a 
company, La Compagnie des Indes (1715-1767) which conducted the slave trade on the monarch’s behalf until 
direct monarchical government began in 1767.  The monarch received commission on every slave transported and 
delivered
37
. The company also colonized the neighbouring island, Réunion (then the Ile de Bourbon)
38
. 
Serious exploitation of Mauritius began with Bertrand Francois Mahe de La Bourdonnais, appointed in 
1735 to administer the island. He became a key figure in the colony’s development. La Bourdonnais focused on 
sugar production, participating in fierce competition with the British to become leaders in the commodity’s 
production and sale, which required huge labour inputs
39
.  The slave population grew from 15,027 in 1767 to 65,367 
by 1807, essentially in response to the need for agricultural labour
40
.   
The main law governing slavery in Mauritius under French and British rule was the Code Noir, initiated by 
Colbert in 1685 and embodied with small modifications for Mauritius in Les Lettres Patentes  of 1723
41
.  
Shockingly, because of its inhuman terms, it is said to have represented an advance on previous practice
42
. The Code 
                                                          
31 R Ross “The Dutch as globalizers in the Western Indian Ocean?” in S J T Evers & V Y Hookoomsing (eds) Globalization and the South-West 
Indian Ocean (2000, Leiden/Réduit, International Institute for Asian Studies/University of Mauritius) at 13. 
32 J C de l’Estrac “Mauriciens enfants de mille races au temps de l’Ile de France”(2004, Port Louis: Graphic Press) at 56. 
33 Ross, Ibid. at 7-15. 
34 Ross, ibid. at 12. 
35 V Hookoomsing “(Re)constructing identities: Creole and ancestral connections.” in S J T Evers & V Y Hookoomsing (eds) Globalization and the 
South-West Indian Ocean (2000, Leiden/Réduit, International Institute for Asian Studies/University of Mauritius) at 149-155.   
36 P J Moree A concise history of Dutch Mauritius, 1598-1710: a fruitful and healthy land (1998, New York: Kegan Paul International and 
International Institute for Asian Studies) 
37 C Taubira L’esclavage Raconté a Ma Fille (2002, Paris, Bibliophane-Daniel Radford) at 44. 
38 R B Allen Slaves, Freedmen, and Indentured Labourers in Mauritius, (1999, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) at 12. 
39 Allen, Ibid. at 56. 
40 K Noël L’esclavage a l’Isle de France (Ile Maurice) de 1715 a 1810 (2nd ed, 1991, Paris) at 32. 
41 Noël, Ibid. at 28. 
42 Noël, Ibid. 
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applied throughout the French colonies, with a significant interlude and exceptions which we expand on below, until 
slavery was finally abolished by France in 1848
43
,   It consisted of 60 articles, modified in some cases to allow 
adaptation to local conditions.     
Treatment of the Code and its provisions by one influential author may be located within a wider tradition 
of horror at the inherent inhumanity of slavery.  Louis Sala-Molins (2007) stressed throughout his interpretive work 
on the Code that it reduced slaves to the status of animals or chattels (biens meubles)
44
.  This is entirely correct, but 
his emphasis on the Code’s nefarious nature45, though justifiable, should not obscure the fact that some slave owners 
broke those clauses embodying even minimal benefits for the slaves. Slave owners did not in this sense behave 
rationally; rather, they exercised their power over slaves for psycho-social reasons that came to predominate over 
economic rationality which suggested recognising them as valuable commodities
46
. 
The Code sought to regulate slavery’s inherent brutalities, recognising that biens-meubles had to be looked 
after precisely because they were property. The imperative was the production and reproduction of slaves and 
slavery in view of their often very low fertility and high mortality rates. Sala-Molins also correctly evokes the 
influence of Catholicism on the Code’s terms47. The triple influences of production, reproduction and Catholicism 
meant that it placed certain minimal obligations on masters.  
Articles 22-6 required masters to feed and clothe their slaves to certain standards
48
. Cases of masters not 
clothing slaves on these terms have been documented; aged slaves were often treated in this way, as ‘non-entities 
and a burden for their masters’49. Yet Article 27 specified that slaves infirm from age or sickness were to be fed by 
their masters or maintained publicly at their expense
50
. This latter clause has been shown to have been regularly 
broken in Mauritius
51
. Specific punishments, sometimes short of death, were set out (articles 36, 38 and 39) for 
slaves and fugitive slaves and those who harboured them
52
. Yet even the savage punishments specified were 
exceeded and unlawfully applied to children as well as adults
53. Infringements of the Code’s terms are likely to have 
been sufficiently significant to have been both the subject of contemporary documentation and also of fundamental 
importance to the slave’s (and their descendants’) well-being. Some appear not to have been prosecuted at the time54. 
These infringements would form part of a legally-based case for reparations, but require further historical research.  
If we accept Karl Noël’s account of a relatively benign application of slavery in Mauritius for much of the 
18
th
 century, and legal infringements by owners that were less systematic than elsewhere, the situation changed at 
the end of the 18
th
 century, when structural and systemic infringement occurred.  The Code and the system which it 
                                                          
43 L Sala-Molins Le Code Noir ou le calvaire de Canaan (4th ed, 2007, Paris: Quadrige Grands Textes, Presses Universitaires de France) at 17. 
44 Sala-Molins,Ibid. at 27. 
45 ‘the intolerable obscenity of each and every one of its clauses’; ‘l’intolérable obscénité de tous et chacun de ses articles’: Sala-Molins, ibid. at 
10. 
46 E C Hirschman and R P Hill “On Human commoditization: a model based upon African-American slavery” (1999)26 Advances in Consumer 
Research 1999 at 394-398. 
47 Sala-Molins,ibid. at 59-71. 
48 Sala-Molins, op.cit at 134-143. 
49 V Teelock “Bitter Sugar. Sugar and Slavery in 19th Century Mauritius (1998, Moka: Mahatma Gandhi Institute) at181. 
50 Sala-Molins, ibid. at144-145. 
51 Teelock, ibid. 
52 Sala-Molins, ibid. at162-163 & 166-169. 
53 Teelock, ibid at 183. 
54 V Teelock A Select Guide to the Sources on Slavery in Mauritius and Slaves Speak Out: The Testimony of Slaves in the Era of Sugar (1995, 
Mauritius, African Cultural Centre, Bell Village). 
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purported to legitimate and regulate were sharply challenged by the French Revolution.  La Déclaration des Droits 
de l’Homme et du Citoyen of 1789 (DDHC 1789) established clear and comprehensive rights for citizens, including 
the right to freedom which is the first-mentioned and inalienable right specified in that text.  It also enshrined in 
Article 4, property rights which may have been thought to imply the right to own slaves.  However, there is little 
doubt that the prior right, because the one most emphasised from the very beginning of the DDHC as a text, was the 
right to freedom and in view of its interpretation since its enactment it appears to offer a basis for reparations claims. 
In direct response to the French Revolution and more specifically to the DDHC itself, an historic slave insurrection 
broke out in Saint-Domingue, (now Haiti), in 1791, sending shock waves around the entire world because it de facto 
abolished slavery in that significant and economically productive colony
55
. Crucially, on 16 Pluviose, An II (1794) 
the French Convention abolished slavery in all French colonies (considered, since 1790, an integral part of France) 
on the basis of the DDHC. However, the Convention’s envoys to Mauritius were threatened and L’Assemblée 
Coloniale, which governed the island’s affairs from 1790 to 1803 --formally and ostensibly subject to the laws of the 
French Republic-- refused to follow it
56
. 
Thus, the colonists rejected French law but the Convention did not enforce its decision despite the fact that 
it had in 1790 declared the colonies an integral part of France and had the support of many soldiers on the island 
who had taken black women as concubines and wished for them to be free
57
. Theoretically at least, the colonials 
could have been forced to follow French law but they were not, possibly because the French had little capacity to 
enforce any decision in a colony where the local élite, allies in the fight against the British, threatened secession. Yet, 
in Guadeloupe, slavery was abolished
58
. Nonetheless, at least until 1802 and arguably down to 1805, when the 
Napoleonic government reaffirmed the Code Noir’s application, all slave owners in Mauritius used slaves 
unlawfully. As Noël puts it (127): ‘Nothing particular happened in Mauritius until 1803…’ when Napoleon became 
Consul. (‘Rien de particulier n’advint a l’Isle de France jusqu’en 1803’).  This ‘nothing particular’ was that slavery 
continued in full force. Napoleon’s reaffirmation of the Code’s application confirms that for the previous decade it 
had been invalid
59
.  Thus, persons enslaved and their descendants unlawfully in the period should have a case for 
compensation against successor companies, as should those born into unlawful slavery and their descendants.  
This history may open successor companies to claims for unlawful enrichment, where cases appear most 
likely to succeed at French law. ‘Enrichissement sans cause’ is the equivalent under French property law. The 
principle is that nobody may be enriched without a valid reason. The English legal concept does not share the same 
legal basis, since at English law the claimant must prove that the defendant has acted dishonestly. Time limitations 
do not apply to such claims in French law. It arises when someone has acted to someone else’s detriment by adding 
value to his own property. There is no need to prove that there was an agreement between the parties
60
.  
Two main conditions must be fulfilled to demonstrate enrichissement sans cause. The first is the material 
condition and the second condition is the cause of action. The material condition is subdivided into three elements. 
                                                          
55 C L R James The Black Jacobins. (1980, London: Alison and Busby)  
56 Noël, ibid. at121-131; W Claude La France et la première abolition de l’esclavage (1794-1802) (1998, Paris: Editions Karthala) at 35. 
57 Noël, ibid. at 126. 
58 Noël, ibid. at 127. 
59 Can unlawful enrichment be claimed against successor companies for this period, as in the USA?   
60 J Carbonnier Droit Civil, Les Biens, Les Obligations (2004, Paris : Presses Universitaires de France) at 2435. 
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The first is that someone’s property has gained value. Property in this context has a broad meaning. The second is 
that the defendant has acted to the claimant’s detriment and as a consequence of this has suffered a loss that has 
added value to the defendant’s property. The third element provides that there must be a causal link between the 
party gaining the advantage and the party suffering the loss
61
. 
The second main condition is the cause of action. This differentiates enrichissement sans cause from 
unlawful enrichment under English law. Under the latter, to build a case based on unlawful enrichment, the claimant 
has to prove that the defendant has acted dishonestly. Under French law, they do not.  
Whether this offence may be the basis of a case against those slave owners or the Mauritius Commercial 
Bank which received compensation from the British government and subsequently became profitable, may be tested 
since the law applies in Mauritius and the conditions may be met although many complex uncertainties exist.    
Whatever the case may be in the ‘enrichissement sans cause’ arena, it is clear that slavery’s legal status had 
changed in a in a broader sense as a result of the French revolution. Historians differ in their assessments of 
Mauritian slavery. The most thorough account of the practice under French rule is that of Noël, who in his 
L’Esclavage a l’Isle de France de 1715 a 1819 (Paris, 1991), presents a generally benign picture, despite or perhaps 
because of the lack of slave voice in his work. According to his Francophile account which verges at times on the 
Panglossian, Labourdonnais took measures to improve the slaves’ lot (82); more generally, slaves were not 
systematically mistreated (26); ‘inhuman masters were rare.  The patriarchal system was practised by masters with a 
certain bonhomie’ (les maitres inhumains furent rares. Le système patriarchal y était pratiqué par les maitres avec un 
certain bonhomie…’:85).62 Teelock (1998: 8-9) justifiably criticizes Noël’s position, following Ross’s63 argument 
that slavery, as a system based on force, could not be mild. Yet Noël’s point about the severity of local slavery 
retains some force, suggesting that infringements prior to the structural insubordination of the colonists were 
comparatively incidental. The legal arguments become powerful and comprehensive after 1794 when the local 
French slave-owning élite refused to apply French law with the consequence that slavery per se was at least 
arguably unlawful.  
These arguments apply to descendant companies and the French state.  Recent developments in France 
have shifted the current context in which the history is being discussed. On the double centenary of the French 
Revolution, France sought explicitly to come to terms with its own history and, consequently, with its role in slavery. 
The question arises as to whether this has advanced or obstructed the case for reparations and legal claims.   
On 10 May 2001, the French Assemblée Nationale enacted the ‘Loi Taubira’, declaring in its first article 
that both the slave trade and slavery constituted crimes against humanity, a crime that became firmly established in 
international law after the Nuremberg trials
64
.  Statutory recognition that slavery was a crime against humanity is 
significant because cases brought alleging crimes against humanity are not subject to any time limitations.  The law 
condemns both activities and French involvement in them. Its second article provides that both activities will be 
included in the history syllabus in secondary schools. The third article provides that the French government intends 
                                                          
61 Arret Boudier (1892) Req. 15 juin 1892, s. 93, 1, 281. 
62 The author has a Francophile approach: see his account of the island’s capture by the British ‘malheureusement’ (‘unfortunately’) at19-20. 
63 R Ross Cape of Torments. Slavery and Resistance in South Africa (1983, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul) 
64 Loi 2001-434; 21 mai 2001, Journal Officiel 
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to request the Council of Europe and United Nations to commemorate the abolition of slavery and the slave trade 
internationally. It also requires France to bring all the countries involved in those activities together to arrive at an 
agreed date for commemorating their end. 
La Loi Taubira is appealing in its explicit recognition of the situation. However it also potentially 
establishes a roadblock to claims for reparations against France or any of those involved. The law’s promoter herself 
claimed in her speech proposing the law and also in print that the payment of reparations is impossible to realise
65
. 
Her position is debatable. The question of whether pecuniary actions may be brought in a similar case was ruled on 
in a decision by the Conseil Constitutionnel in February 2004. The Conseil is not a Court but has authority to assess 
whether a law contravenes the Constitution when appeals are made to it by competent persons such as parliamentary 
deputies and senators. Its decision was reached following passage of a law apologising for the state’s treatment of 
Jews during the Second World War, for which Jewish community organisations sought compensation from the 
French government. The Conseil Constitutionnel held that:  
 
‘Laws enacted by Parliament to condemn particular past events and which declared that these events are 
crimes against humanity are not open for pecuniary actions. For these laws are also called memorial laws.’ 66 
 
The Conseil Constitutionnel’s decision would have to be overturned for the Loi Taubira to provide a basis 
for claims of any sort.  Yet the Conseil d’Etat later stated in a 2004 opinion that the purpose of a law is to provide 
rather than to deny rights to individuals, arguably giving rise to a contradiction (Conseil d’Etat: Opinion 250-2004).  
The Conseil’s decision therefore stands until and unless it can be challenged.   
Some basis for building a case arguably exists in the ‘fundamental principles’ of French law. The Conseil 
d’Etat (established by Napoleon in 1803) decides on these principles which are neither mentioned in the French 
Constitution nor enunciated in any statute. The Conseil d’Etat is the highest court in French administrative law. The 
‘fundamental principles’ are unwritten rules which a judge may refer to if rights have been breached67. In Société 
Eky (1960) it held that DDHC 1789 has always been part of the French Constitution, and further held that actions 
may be brought against the State under its terms
68
.    
In a judgement relating to the freedom of association in 1956, the Conseil d’Etat decided that certain rights 
cannot be denied to the individual. It also held that the State cannot amend them
69
. The incapacity of the state to 
change these rights was reaffirmed in Condamine a year later
70
. Further, and crucially, the Conseil ruled in the same 
judgement that since they originate in the DDHC certain rights are imprescriptible, and no time limit can operate 
against individuals. The first right announced by the DDHC itself is of course that to freedom and although the 
DDHC did not itself formally abolish slavery, its terms are, as the slaves of Saint Domingue argued, entirely 
incompatible with slavery.    
                                                          
65 Taubira, L’esclavage at 175. 
66 Les Decisions du Conseil Constitutionnel (2004) at 56. 
67 P L Frier & J Petit Précis de Droit Administratif 8th Ed.(2008, Paris: Montchrestien l’Extension Edition) at 15. 
68 Conseil d’Etat, Société Eky, 12 February 1960, R.101 
69 Conseil d’Etat, Liberté d’Association (1956) Les Grands Arrêts de la Jurisprudence Administratives (26th ed., 2008, Paris Dalloz) at 157. 
70 Conseil d’Etat, Condamine, (1957), Les Grands Arrêts de la Jurisprudence Administratives (26th ed., 2008, Paris, Dalloz) at172-178. 
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These judgements appear to hold out some hope for legal actions under French law, directed at the French 
state (in which case they would have to be taken in France) and the Compagnie des Indes’ successor companies.   
The Conseil Constitutionnel recently made a judgement that appears to learned commentators to criticise the state 
for passing memorial laws, implicitly calling on legislators either to desist from doing so or to give them normative 
effects.  The judgement asserted the unconstitutionality of the memorial law’s article denying citizens the right to 
freedom of expression if they deny the Armenian genocide of 1915
71
.  Nevertheless, the judgement criticised these 
laws’ lack of normative effects and this issue remains to be resolved.  Any resolution is likely to have significant 
consequences for our arguments as well as for the law itself.  Currently, the situation is that these laws are 
increasingly contested by deputies, forcing the issue for legislators.   
 
PRIMA FACIE LEGAL INFRINGEMENTS UNDER BRITISH RULE  
 
France lost possession of Mauritius in 1810. By the Treaty of Paris of 1814, Britain acquired permanent 
possession of the island and its dependencies. In 1807, the slave trade had already been abolished in all British 
colonies; the Slave Trade Consolidation Act of 1827 extended and consolidated the prohibition
72
. The slave trade 
nevertheless persisted, as some countries permitted its continuation and British companies continued to profit from it. 
It was alleged that the first Governor of Mauritius, Sir Robert Farquhar connived at its unlawful persistence there
73
.  
Many of the slaves used on Mauritius were unlawfully imported; it has been suggested that many were brought from 
the French-held island of Réunion where slave trading remained legal
74
. Clearly, those people traded and their 
descendants have a prima facie case against descendant companies and possibly the British government if active 
connivance can be shown.  
When Britain took Mauritius over, it did so via a significant compromise with the Franco-Mauritians. 
Britain acted cautiously for fear of not upsetting this established governing élite, many of whom owned some of the 
55,000 slaves then on the island
75
. French was kept as an official language. Those previously administrating 
Mauritian affairs remained in office. The legal system was essentially retained. French law remained in force, 
although certain areas of law which French legislation did not cover came under English common law
76
. A strong 
and cohesive agricultural élite was consolidated under British rule
77
. This historic compromise was significant for 
slavery’s regulation.    
The period 1815-1835 saw considerable conflict between the British imperial apparatus and the local 
Franco-Mauritian élite on the slavery issue. Though the lawfulness of slave owners’ actions was less categorically 
                                                          
71 Fasc. 1440: Contentieux Constitutionel des Droits Fondamentaux.  s.106 ả 117.108: atteinte a la liberté d’expression et effet normative des 
lois mémorielles;  A Levade, B Mathieu “Le législateur ne peut fixer des verities et en sanctionner la contestation” La Semaine Juridique Edition 
Générale no.14, 2 avril 2012, 425.  
72 J Walvin Black Ivory: A History of British Slavery (1992, London: Fontana Press) at 165. 
73 M Sherwood “Britain, the Slave Trade and slavery, 1808-1843 (2004)/46/2 Race and Class 54-77 at 59. 
74 J Black The Slave Trade (2006, London: Social Affairs Unit) at 70; M Carter, V Govindan & S Peerthum The Last Slaves: Liberated Africans in 
Nineteenth Century Mauritius (2003, Port Louis: Centre for Research in Indian Ocean Studies) at 10. 
75 Teelock, 1998 at 21. 
76 B Nadal Les Constitutions de l’Isle Maurice (1962, Mauritius Publishing Co., Port Louis) at 79. 
77 Teelock, 1998 at 75, 115, 175; R Sandbrook, M Edelman, P Heller &J Teichman Social Democracy in the Global Periphery. Origins, Challenges, 
Prospects.  (2007, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) at 131-132. 
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thrown into question than it had been immediately after 1794, it was nevertheless questionable after the British 
instituted a Protector of Slaves with the ostensible aim of ameliorating slaves’ conditions. This brought major 
conflict with the Franco Mauritians and, in 1832, open revolt by them; the first Protector was soon pushed out as the 
Governor took the Franco-Mauritian side. This was part of a wider revolt against British amelioration efforts.   
In the period of British rule prior to Emancipation, numerous laws were introduced to improve the slaves’ 
position, but these were not observed by the slave owners and indeed were explicitly rejected by them. For example, 
after 1827, wages had to be paid to slaves working on Sundays. Yet these laws were, according to the leading 
historian of slavery in that period, ‘ignored altogether’78.  The entire corpus of ‘Amelioration Laws’ was rendered 
‘almost inoperative’ by the Franco-Mauritian slave owners 79 .  For example, despite Article 11 of the 1827 
Ordinance on the Amelioration of Slaves which forbade them, whips were used on slaves; government officials and 
planters alike accepted that this was the case
80
. The Appeal Court, dominated by the Franco-Mauritians, rendered the 
punishment laws nugatory. Thus, the notoriously brutal slave owner Desjardins had a fine for beating a woman slave 
against the terms of the Code Noir, remitted on appeal
81
.   
A systemic ‘reinterpretation’ of a crucial law was to follow.  During summer 1833, the Slave Emancipation 
Act was passed in both Houses of Parliament declaring that all slaves were free in all British colonies; they were no 
longer their owners’ property82. Following their practice after the American Revolution, parliament voted £20 
million in government bonds to the slave owners as compensation.  Jeremie, a senior British official complained at 
the time that to award compensation to Mauritian slave owners was to legitimate the position of those who had 
imported slaves unlawfully
83
. Since many of the slaves working in Mauritius were imported illegally, it seems 
possible that the Mauritius Commercial Bank, currently a highly profitable company that was founded on the basis 
of compensation funds, may be open to cases of unlawful enrichment as discussed above.   
Cook’s (2003) formulation that American slave managers could literally claim that their people were their 
greatest asset also applied in Mauritius and they therefore sought to retain labour even after Emancipation to meet 
growing demand for sugar
84
. Slave owners were concerned that if ex-slaves were to be employed and given wages 
there was a strong possibility of their being unwilling to work after being paid
85
. Moreover, the slave owners needed 
to buy time because they were, behind closed doors, looking for a new type of labour as they were unwilling to 
employ ex-slaves. In 1834, Parliament decided, partly as a result, that liberation would be conducted in two stages. 
In the first stage, slaves would become ‘apprentices’ for six years; in the second, they would be free. Slaves had 
expected full freedom.  The decision therefore created uproar: petitions were sent to Parliament and demonstrations 
and strikes occurred in the West Indies. Consequently, the period was reduced to four years
86
. 
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Thus, slavery was officially abolished in Mauritius on 1st February 1835 but ex-slaves were not actually 
given their full freedom until 31 March 1839
87




‘Apprenticeship’ was enacted by the British Parliament and it was therefore lawful.  However, the way that 
it was implemented appears not to have been. The ex-slave owners simply carried on as before despite apprentices’ 
raised expectations. As Meyer and Scott (1983)
89
 point out in their affirmation of a long-standing insight from Marx 
and Weber, formal changes in regulatory regimes generally are at odds with inherited norms, leading to conflicting 
expectations on the part of actors. As Tinker (1977) pointed out, the Franco-Mauritians ‘continued to dwell in the 
atmosphere of pre-revolutionary France’ after the British annexation 90 . ‘Apprentices’ were in fact effectively 
confined to their quarters on plantations; their masters prevented them from leaving by using guards.  They also 
bought and sold them as before
91
. To some extent, this was implicitly condoned by government since each estate 
was legally required to have two guards, but owners both benefitted and offended by treating apprentices as though 
they were still slaves bound to their masters
92
. The question is whether this may have constituted false imprisonment 
under English law, since in effect slaves were not free to leave their plantation quarters, the Camps des Noirs.   
False imprisonment is a tort, defined as the infliction of bodily restraint not expressly or impliedly 
authorized by law
93
. The definition of imprisonment was established in 1520 by Termes de la Ley: 
 
‘restraint of a man’s liberty whether it be in the open field, or in the stocks or cage in the street, or in a man’s 
own house, as well as in the common gaol. And in all these places the party so restrained is said to be a prisoner so long 
as he has not his liberty freely to go at all times to all places wither he will…’94. 
 
In Grainger v Hill (1838), i.e. prior to the ‘apprentices’ full freedom, it was held that false imprisonment is 
an intentional deprivation of a person’s freedom of movement from a particular place for any time, however short, 
unless expressly authorized by law. In this case, the court held that it was not a necessary condition that the claimant 
was aware of the false imprisonment.    
Prima facie, false imprisonment’s conditions as they existed at the time were met by the apprentices’ 
position. They were forced to remain on the plantations.  Restraint was enforced by armed guards; escape through 
marooning was (as ever) a possibility but guards had to be evaded and serious risks run while punishment was 
inevitable. 
Potential defendants are five sugar estates currently operating in Mauritius and which produced sugar when 
the island was under French and British dominion. They are Flacq Union Sugar Estate Limited, Medine Bambous, 
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Bel Ombre, St Pierre, and Constance Sugar Estates Limited
95. The slaves’ living quarters are still in place. Many 
earlier companies have changed their names but the successor companies may be traced and many of these have also 
operated in partnership with the five sugar estates mentioned above. The TJC has the authority to access all sugar 
estate records, past and present. These companies may be open to cases for unlawful enrichment through false 




We have attempted to counter the important ‘legal at the time’ contention in the Mauritian case, an exercise 
that we suggest may also be conducted fruitfully for other countries. We put forward four key counter-arguments. 
First, the Dutch VOC executed alleged offenders without trial, which was unlawful at the time. Second, for some 
years after 1794, French law had abolished slavery but was rejected by the island’s slave-owning élite despite their 
nominal adherence to French law. Third, and related to the previous proposition, at French law the right to liberty is 
inalienable, has been since the DDHC and claims that it has been breached cannot be time limited. Fourth, false 
imprisonment was an offence at English law well before the 19
th
 century and appears to have occurred during 
‘apprenticeship’. Our arguments are limited in the sense that they do not pursue the broader question of the legal 
foundations of slavery, a much wider undertaking that would require a much more extended discussion.  Our 
arguments nevertheless encompass both specific events and periods and the broader phenomenon of slavery and the 
slave trade, post French Revolution. They may be strengthened by further documentation which may be provided by 
the TJC and through work in the Mauritian National Archives and elsewhere.  Nevertheless, we contend that slavery 
was not always ‘legal at the time’.  This is for two main reasons: first, torts were undoubtedly committed under 
slavery and second,  the colonists acted against the explicit letter of the law after the French abolition of slavery.   
Our propositions counter the argument advanced by some anti-reparations scholars
96
 that demands for 
reparations are automatically flawed because they necessarily involve a counter-factual, i.e. comparison of a world 
without slavery (which cannot be observed) with the actual historical situation. They cumulatively also suggest that 
ground should not be too readily conceded to the ‘legal at the time’ argument in any national context.  
Normally, laws were instituted that allowed profit-maximisation by means acceptable to élites. Yet the law 
and its formal terms must always--and here slavery is far from an exception--be located firmly within the context of 
wider social relations. Under slavery, power relations were such that slave owners could act largely without fear of 
consequences. In the Mauritian context, the slave owners broke even the terms of the Code Noir which it could be 
argued did little more than codify their interests as property owners. They rejected the French Revolution’s legal 
challenge. Then, when the slave owning élite wished to reject British ‘amelioration’ laws, they referred to the 
unusual terms of the compromise negotiated when the British took over. In short, they then referred to the status of 
French law (which had crucially changed in content) on the island. They confined ex- slaves to their estates under 
the transitional ‘apprenticeship’ arrangements.  Thus, while Noël argues that slave abuse was not systematic under 
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French rule, this tends to obscure the fundamentally unlawful nature of the practice of slavery in the decade after 
1794.   
A case appears to exist against companies operating slavery and the slave trade unlawfully in the years 
immediately after 1794 on the ground of unlawful enrichment. A case against France for injuries arising from its 
failure to enforce the abolition of slavery may also exist. A (probably smaller) possibility also exists of cases under 
the Loi Taubira since it remains unclear despite affirmations to the contrary whether such a law can deny individuals 
rights and therefore operate against slaves’ descendants material interests. Whether its essentially declaratory nature 
will serve to raise the profile of slavery and the slave trade and thereby both raise incentives and provide grounds for 
descendants to make legally-based demands or, on the other hand, simply block them remains uncertain. Legal 
arguments based on unlawful-at-the-time false imprisonment may have some purchase in English law, but the 
French civil law tradition appears to offer better prospects since it is more rights-based, transparent and clearly 
codified.  
If the defence that slavery was ‘lawful at the time’ is at least questionable, it may prove inadequate for 
states and companies alike seeking to defend themselves against demands for reparations. Redress may be made by 
companies anxious to avoid negative publicity in the era of ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’. Companies and 
indeed others may ultimately be judged in the court of public opinion, where norms and politics play a larger role 
than in legal contexts. Nevertheless, historical-legal arguments such as those we advance may have purposes that 
transcend the boundaries of the legal system itself, by playing a part in mobilising opinion. 
 
